
REDUCING PLASTIC PRODUCTION IN A POST–1.5°C WORLD

A test of resolve for the international community



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Acronyms and abbreviations

CO_2	carbon dioxide
CO_2e	carbon dioxide equivalent
GHG	greenhouse gas(es)
IEA	International Energy Agency
INC	Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on plastic pollution
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
NGL	natural gas liquids



Executive Summary

Global human greenhouse gases emissions have continued to rise in 2025, reaching a historical record high of 38 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO_2).[1] It has now become clear that the Paris Agreement target of keeping global warming under 1.5°C relative to pre-industrial levels will not be reached, and that our planet is entering an era of 1.5°C overshoot.[2] To mitigate the severe environmental, socio-economic, and health harms bound to unfold in a post-1.5°C world, global emissions must be drastically and urgently reduced to reach net zero as soon as possible. According to the most recent assessment, the lowest peak warming outcome currently within reach (around 1.7°C above pre-industrial levels, with a return to 1.5°C later in the century) would require emissions reductions of around 60% by 2035 and 90% by 2050 relative to 2019, with net-zero emissions reached around 2050.[3] Such emissions reduction pathways require immediate, profound, and sustained changes to our industry, our economy, and our way of life.

This must include immediate action to reduce global plastic production and consumption. Plastic production is one of the most carbon-intensive industries, estimated to generate emissions equivalent to over two billion tonnes of CO_2 every year[4] — approximately twice as much as the aviation sector.[5] If current policies remain unchanged, global plastic production and waste generation are projected to almost triple by 2060.[6] Annual emissions from fossil-based plastics are expected to more than double to exceed 4 billion tonnes of CO_2 by 2060.[7] On this trajectory, cumulative emissions from plastics between 2026 and 2050 would amount to 67 billion tonnes of CO_2 — which represents just over one half of the carbon budget remaining to give humanity even odds of keeping global warming under the 1.5°C target, or 27% of the carbon budget remaining to have a very good chance of limiting the overshoot to 1.7°C.[8] Plastic pollution in the environment further compounds climate change impacts by disrupting the functioning of natural carbon sinks and the carbon cycle, undermining nature-based solutions for climate change mitigation.

Yet fossil fuel and petrochemical companies, faced with an imminent decline in global oil demand in the transport and energy sectors, are doubling down on oil and gas to increase plastic production, keeping the Earth on course for a climate catastrophe. It is estimated that the plastics sector could account for 20% of global oil consumption by 2050,[9] compared to around 12% today.[10] Petrochemical companies are pivoting towards plastics in pursuit of a self-fulfilling prophecy, investing billions of dollars in capital expenditures to deploy new production units or expand the capacity of existing facilities,[11] propped up by state subsidies estimated at over US$80 billion for the year 2024.[12] The industry's pivot towards plastic production threatens to precipitate the climate crisis even as the economic case for this strategy remains unproven.[13] Market projections are highly susceptible to a decoupling of demand for plastics from economic growth:[14] shifting consumer preferences towards sustainable products and a tougher regulatory environment can fundamentally tip the scales and reduce global demand for plastics.

The overwhelming majority of the international community has come to the realisation that reducing plastic production is imperative to reduce emissions and give our planet a fighting chance to keep global warming under control. The Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on plastic pollution (INC) was established with a clear mandate: to develop an international legally binding instrument on plastic pollution addressing the full life cycle of plastics to promote sustainable production and consumption and reduce plastic pollution, taking into account the best available science.[15] To date, a total of 145 countries from every continent have expressed support for provisions on production reduction in the plastics treaty.[16]

Despite clear support for reducing plastic production from an overwhelming majority of states, and the urgent necessity of cutting emissions to mitigate the climate impacts of plastics, fossil fuel and petrochemical companies, backed by a handful of oil producing countries with a heavily subsidised plastics industry, are actively opposing production reduction targets and have deployed unprecedented efforts to sabotage negotiations. Aggressive lobbying tactics, including harassment and intimidation of independent scientists and pressure exercised on government delegations,[17] have brought negotiations to a deadlock, undermining multilateralism and the INC's mandate to end plastic pollution.

The plastics treaty is a test of resolve for the international community: INC delegates must not yield to bullies and give up on multilateralism; they must rally around high-ambition countries and deliver a robust treaty setting legally binding, measurable, and time-bound targets to reduce the production and consumption of primary plastics. If this cannot be achieved in the current negotiation framework for a universal instrument on plastic pollution, alternative avenues must be explored to secure the broadest possible support for a multilateral instrument.

Introduction

Plastic overproduction, overconsumption, and pollution are fuelling a multidimensional environmental crisis, with severe impacts on climate and other planetary boundaries.[18] Plastic production is one of the most carbon-intensive industries, generating greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions equivalent to over two billion tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO_2e) every year.[19] As climate change is accelerating and causing severe environmental, socio-economic and health harms on a global scale, the overwhelming majority of the international community has come to the realisation that reducing plastic production is imperative to reduce emissions and give our planet a fighting chance to keep global warming under control. The Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on plastic pollution (INC) was established with a clear mandate: to develop an international legally binding instrument on plastic pollution addressing the full life cycle of plastics to promote sustainable production and consumption and reduce plastic pollution, taking into account the best available science.[20]

Yet fossil fuel and petrochemical companies, faced with an imminent decline in global oil demand, are doubling down on plastics. Backed by a handful of oil producing states, they have deployed unprecedented efforts to sabotage negotiations for the plastics treaty, disregarding climate science and prioritising their short-term profits over the safety and well-being of humankind. The plastics treaty is a test of resolve for the international community: INC delegates must not yield to bullies, and rally around high-ambition countries to deliver a robust treaty with legally binding, measurable, and time-bound targets to reduce plastic production and consumption to sustainable levels. Delegates at climate negotiations must strongly support an ambitious, robust plastics reduction treaty.



1. Emissions reduction pathways in a post-1.5°C world

Despite warnings by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that unchanged emissions levels would almost exhaust the remaining carbon budget for meeting the 1.5°C climate target by the end of the decade,[21] global fossil carbon emissions have continued to rise, reaching a historical record high of 38.1 Gt CO_2e in 2025.[22] The years 2023–2025 were the warmest on record, with an average temperature estimated between 1.35°C and 1.61°C above pre-industrial levels.[23] Under current policies, it is estimated that global temperatures could reach 2.8°C above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century.[24] It has now become clear that the Paris Agreement target of keeping global warming under 1.5°C will not be reached, and that the world is entering an era of 1.5°C overshoot.[25]

The consequences of exceeding the 1.5°C target are known and are already being felt today, increasing risks to human health, livelihoods, food security, water supply, human security, and economic growth.[26] In Europe, the 2026 summer was the hottest ever recorded for several countries, with exceptional heat waves, drought, and wildfires experienced across the region.[27] According to preliminary estimates, the cost of the 2026 summer heat waves for European economies may amount to at least €180 billion, equivalent to one percentage point of the region's GDP — and the expected growth for 2026.[28] Yet it is people in the Global South — those who have historically contributed the least to emissions — who remain most exposed and vulnerable to climate change.[29]

Abrupt and/or irreversible changes to the climate system, the biosphere, and human societies have become unavoidable in a post-1.5°C world.[30] Health experts are calling for climate change to be recognised and addressed as a global health emergency.[31] The likelihood of triggering tipping points, and the severity of impacts, will keep increasing with every new molecule of GHG released into the atmosphere. To mitigate severe environmental, socio-economic and health harms, global emissions must be drastically and urgently reduced to reach net zero as soon as possible. According to the most recent assessment, the lowest peak warming outcome currently within reach (around 1.7°C above pre-industrial levels, with a return to 1.5°C later in the century) would require emissions reductions of around 60% by 2035 and 90% by 2050 relative to 2019, with net-zero emissions reached around 2050.[32] Such emissions reduction pathways require immediate, profound, and sustained changes to our industry, our economy, and our way of life.

To limit the overshoot of the Paris Agreement 1.5°C target and keep global warming under 1.7°C relative to pre-industrial levels, global emissions need to be reduced by 60% by 2035 and 90% by 2050 relative to 2019, with net-zero emissions reached around 2050.





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2. The climate impacts of plastics

2.1 GHG emissions across the plastic life cycle

Plastic manufacturing is one of the most carbon-intensive industries, relying almost exclusively on fossil-based feedstock derived from oil and natural gas liquids (NGL).[33] Plastics are responsible for significant GHG emissions across their life cycle, from the extraction and refining of raw materials, cracking for monomer production, polymerisation for resin and fibre production, product shaping and manufacturing, distribution, and use, to waste management and disposal[34] (**Figure 1**).

The bulk of emissions (over 90%) are generated during the extraction, conversion and production stages.[35] Indirect emissions from electricity generation and consumption represent a substantial share of emissions,[36] as plastic production relies on energy-intensive processes.[37] On average, it is estimated that each tonne of plastic polymer produced generates between 4.5 and 6.5 tonnes of CO_2 equivalent (CO_2e) during the production process.[38] With 460 million tonnes of primary plastics produced globally in 2019,[39] plastic production is estimated to have resulted in annual emissions of about 2.24 Gt CO_2e.[40] This accounts for 5.3% of all anthropogenic CO_2 emissions in 2019,[41] about twice as much as the aviation sector.[42]



These estimates account for plastic production alone and do not include emissions generated during end-of-life stages. Incineration in waste-to-energy facilities, as well as sorting, melting, and treatment in recycling plants, result in additional annual GHG emissions estimated at 96 Mt CO_2e and 49 Mt CO_2e, respectively.[43]



Yet only a small fraction of plastic waste is managed: the vast majority (79%) ends up in landfills or in the natural environment,[44] where it accumulates and continues to release GHG into the atmosphere long after being discarded, either through open burning or natural degradation. Plastic particles exposed to ambient solar radiation or left to decompose in water have been found to release CO_2 as well as methane and ethylene,[45] two potent GHG. Unmanaged waste dumped and burnt in landfills is estimated to generate annual emissions of 16 Mt CO_2e,[46] and the natural degradation of plastics leaked into the environment could represent annual emissions of about 2.2 Mt CO_2e for plastics accumulated in the ocean.[47]




Figure 1: Schematic representation of the plastic life cycle showing the main direct and indirect upstream and downstream sources of GHG emissions, with estimates of global emissions volumes in Mt CO_2e (sources: Lawrence Berkeley National Lab;[48] Zheng et al.;[49] Shen et al.[50]).

If current policies remain unchanged, global plastic production and waste generation are projected to almost triple by 2060, reaching 1.2 billion tonnes and 1 billion tonnes, respectively.[51] Annual emissions from fossil-based plastics across the whole plastic life cycle are projected to more than double to reach 4.3 Gt CO_2e by 2060 (**Figure 2**).[52]




Figure 2: Historical and projected global GHG emissions from plastics under a business-as-usual scenario, 2015–2060 (source: OECD[53]). The dashed line in the year 2019 denotes the limit between historical data and projections.

On this modelled trajectory, cumulative emissions from plastics between 2026 and 2050 would amount to 67 Gt CO_2e. To put this figure in perspective, this would consume just over one half of the carbon budget remaining to give humanity even odds of keeping global warming under the 1.5°C target, or 27% of the carbon budget remaining to have a very good chance of limiting the overshoot to 1.7°C.[54]

If present policies remain unchanged, cumulative global emissions from plastics between 2026 and 2050 would represent just over one half of the carbon budget remaining to give humanity even odds of keeping global warming under the 1.5°C target.



2.2 Disruption of natural carbon sinks

The impacts of plastics on our climate go well beyond the direct release of GHG into the atmosphere. The degradation of plastics releases organic compounds as well as toxic particles and chemicals into the environment, with not yet fully understood but potentially major impacts on biodiversity[55] and our climate.[56] Biodiversity and climate are closely interconnected: adverse impacts on biodiversity in turn compromise the essential climate regulation function of ecosystems.[57]

A growing body of evidence indicates that plastics present in the environment can disrupt the functioning of natural carbon sinks and the carbon cycle, undermining nature-based solutions for climate change mitigation. For example, microplastics present in the marine environment have been found to negatively affect photosynthesis by phytoplankton as well as zooplankton development and reproduction, with serious implications for the functioning of the biological carbon pump,[58] an essential process that enables the ocean to capture and store carbon and buffer against climate change. Likewise, in terrestrial environments studies suggest that plastic pollution can disrupt the biological and geochemical processes enabling the capture and storage of carbon within the soil,[59] and promote the emission of GHG from the soil to the atmosphere.[60]

Plastic pollution in the environment can disrupt the functioning of natural carbon sinks and the carbon cycle, undermining nature-based solutions for climate change mitigation.

With leakage of plastics into the environment projected to almost double by 2060,[61] the environmental and climate impacts of plastic pollution will get worse unless action is taken to drastically reduce plastic waste.



3. The petrochemical industry's deadly bet on plastics

As global plastic consumption is expected to keep rising, petrochemical companies are doubling down on oil and gas to increase plastic production, keeping the Earth on course for a climate catastrophe. The industry's deadly bet on plastic production is driven by expected shifts in global demand for fossil fuels: under all scenarios, demand in the transport and energy sectors is expected to fall in advanced economies, while demand for petrochemical products is expected to keep growing, mainly driven by the Asian market.[62] Under stated policies, modelling by the International Energy Agency predicts a rapid decline in oil supply for energy uses, accompanied by a steady increase in supply for non-energy uses, including petrochemical products (**Figure 3**).[63] Likewise, forecasts by McKinsey[64] and Goldman Sachs[65] both anticipate a peak in global oil demand around 2030–2035 but expect declines in demand in the transport sector to be offset by growing demand for petrochemicals. The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries expects oil demand in the petrochemicals sector to grow from 15.5 million barrels per day in 2024 to 20.2 million barrels per day in 2050.[66] It is estimated that the plastics sector could account for 20% of global oil consumption by 2050,[67] compared to around 12% today.[68]






Figure 3: Historical and projected oil supply (in exajoules, representing the amount of energy contained in oil barrels) for energy and non-energy (including petrochemicals) uses under the Stated Policies scenario (source: IEA[69]). The dashed line in the year 2024 denotes the limit between historical data and projections.

Petrochemical companies are pivoting towards plastics in pursuit of a self-fulfilling prophecy, investing billions of dollars in capital expenditures to deploy new production units or expand the capacity of existing facilities[70] (**Box 1**). The plastic rush is bankrolled by the global financial system, with an estimated US$590.8 billion in financing granted to the top fifteen petrochemical companies between 2019 and 2025 (including US$251.9 billion specifically dedicated to the development of their petrochemical activities);[71] and propped up by state subsidies, estimated at over US$80 billion for the year 2024.[72]

The industry's pivot towards plastic production threatens to precipitate the climate crisis even as the economic case for this strategy remains unproven. The central assumption underpinning the projected growth in oil demand for plastic production is that sustained population and GDP growth in emerging economies will result in increased demand for plastic products.[73] This makes market projections highly susceptible to a decoupling of demand for plastics from economic growth.[74] Shifting consumer preferences towards sustainable products and a tougher regulatory environment can fundamentally tip the scales and reduce demand for plastics and oil.

Not all market observers share the industry's optimism for the future of the plastics sector. Forecasts by Norwegian energy specialist DNV suggest peak demand for petrochemicals may already have been reached, noting that petrochemicals were the single hardest-hit sector in 2026 with a 7% global decline in non-energy oil demand between 2025 and 2026.[75] In Europe, the chemical industry is 'at a breaking point' with plants operating well below capacity and decreasing capital and R&I spending, due in part to weak domestic demand and high gas prices.[76] In recent years, credit rating agencies have issued a number of warnings and downgraded the ratings of major plastic producers,[77] notably citing 'chronic overcapacity' in the Asian market as a concern.[78] Analysts are raising the alarm, pointing out that investing to increase or maintain hydrocarbon production, and investing in new or upgraded refining capacity to produce petrochemical feedstocks, can entail significant financial risks.[79]



As global oil demand in the transport and energy sectors is declining, petrochemical companies are pivoting towards plastics in pursuit of a self-fulfilling prophecy, threatening to precipitate the climate crisis.

BOX 1 – INEOS Project One

In July 2026, a heavy-lift vessel entered the port of Antwerp, Belgium, carrying a 55-m high, 6,920-tonne cracker module built in the United Arab Emirates.[80] The module is one of the final pieces of Project One, a giant ethylene production complex built by British chemical company INEOS in the heart of Europe's largest petrochemical cluster.[81] With an initial price tag of €4 billion, it is presented as the most capital-intensive investment project in the European chemical sector in the last 25 years.[82] The complex is designed to have an annual production capacity of 1.45 million tonnes of ethylene, using ethane feedstock imported from the United States. INEOS claims the facility will be 'the greenest cracker in Europe', with a carbon footprint estimated at half the emissions of the best performing crackers.[83] According to the project's environmental impact assessment, the facility is 'CO_2 capture-ready' and could achieve net-zero emissions within ten years of start-up.[84]

In a context of market oversupply, unreliable supply chains, and policy shift towards reducing primary plastic production in Europe, analysts have questioned the project's financial viability and called it a 'risky venture'.[85] Project One is also facing strong backlash on account of its environmental and human health impacts. The environmental permit issued by the Flemish government was struck down by a court on the ground that the environmental impact assessment failed to meet requirements under EU nature protection laws.[86] A new permit was issued in January 2024 after INEOS submitted a revised environmental impact assessment.[87] Yet INEOS's low-emissions claims remain disputed by civil society organisations: a new lawsuit brought by ClientEarth and other NGOs alleges the project's emissions could be five times higher than estimated by the revised impact assessment when accounting for upstream and downstream emissions.[88]

Europe does not need more plastics. Investments in new production capacity, dressed up in 'net zero' rhetoric and banking on unproven carbon capture technology, are environmentally harmful and economically unsound, and should be discouraged.

Like other petrochemical companies, INEOS opposes policies to reduce plastic production and instead promotes a narrative emphasising 'sustainable production', 'circularity', and 'net zero' emissions.[89] Two INEOS representatives attended the latest round of negotiations for the plastics treaty — as many delegates as Kiribati,[90] a small Pacific Island state under immediate threat from climate change.



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4. The plastics treaty: a test of resolve for the international community

4.1 Reducing plastic production to mitigate climate impacts

Reducing global plastic production is imperative to curb GHG emissions and give our planet a fighting chance to keep global warming below catastrophic levels, in line with the obligations of states under international law to prevent significant harm to the climate system and the environment,[91] and to protect and promote the human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment.[92]

An ambitious international instrument on plastic pollution that addresses the full life cycle of plastics, including legally binding provisions requiring states parties to reduce plastic production to sustainable levels based on measurable, time-bound targets, presents the best opportunity to achieve that goal. During INC negotiations, Rwanda and Peru called for the treaty to include a global target for reducing plastic production by 40% by 2040 compared to a 2025 baseline.[93] Modelling by the Environmental Investigation Agency and Eunomia shows that a 40% reduction in plastic production relative to current levels between 2030 and 2040 in high-ambition countries joined by a handful of key producing countries could reduce global GHG emissions from plastics by as much as 21% compared to a business-as-usual scenario (**Table 1**).

Table 1: Expected reductions in GHG emissions from plastics under three different scenarios involving reductions in plastic production in different countries (source: Environmental Investigation Agency & Eunomia[94]).

scenario	cumulative GHG emissions	emissions reductions
high-ambition countries	46–47.3 Gt CO_2e	3.8–5.1 Gt CO_2e (7.4–10%)
high-ambition countries + China	41.7–44.6 Gt CO_2e	6.5–9.4 Gt CO_2e (12.7–18.4%)
high-ambition countries + China + emerging producers	40.3–40.6 Gt CO_2e	10.5–10.8 Gt CO_2e (20.5–21.1%)

To date, a total of 145 countries from every continent have expressed support for provisions on production reduction in the global plastics treaty[95] (**Figure 4**). However, widespread support for the objective of reducing global plastic production masks uneven ambition and commitment. While high-ambition countries such as Rwanda, Peru, Thailand and the United Kingdom support a treaty providing for individual obligations of result with legally binding national targets, some countries with an established plastic manufacturing sector like Canada, Japan and South Korea are reluctant to commit to anything more than a collective obligation of means.[96] The government of Alberta in Canada, for example, continues to provide billions of dollars in subsidies to the petrochemical industry,[97] despite Canada's commitments to phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies[98] and cut emissions by 45–50% below 2005 levels by 2035.[99] Plastic-producing countries committed to mitigating climate change must lead by example and rally around high-ambition countries in support of a strong plastics treaty with legally binding targets for reducing plastic production and phasing out harmful subsidies.

4.2 Obstruction and lobbying by the petrochemical bloc

Despite clear support for reducing plastic production from an overwhelming majority of states, and the urgent necessity of cutting emissions to mitigate the climate impacts of plastics, a handful of fossil fuel and petrochemical companies and oil producing countries are actively opposing production reduction targets and undermining negotiations for the plastics treaty.[100]

The 'like-minded group' of countries opposing production reduction is comprised almost exclusively of major plastic and/or oil and gas producers with a state-backed petrochemical sector, such as China, Iran, Russia, and Saudi Arabia (**Figure 4**). Countries opposing production reduction also tend to have a petrochemical sector dominated by state-owned enterprises, with strategic, fiscal and geopolitical incentives to continue expanding production capacity.[101] For example, China is the world's largest polymer producer[102] and exporter of plastic products by volume and value,[103] with a state-owned petrochemical industry propped up by abundant government subsidies, estimated at US$19 billion for the year 2024.[104] Likewise, Saudi Arabia is the world's second largest oil and NGL producer[105] and third largest producer of plastic polymers,[106] and its petrochemical industry is by far the most heavily subsidised: with nearly US$40 billion estimated to have been handed out to the industry in 2024, Saudi Arabia alone is responsible for half of all government subsidies to the sector.[107] The United States — the world's top oil and NGL producer[108] and second largest polymer producer[109] — has recently aligned with the 'like-minded group', reportedly urging a number of delegations to reject production reduction caps in the treaty.[110]






Figure 4: Map showing country positions regarding the inclusion of production reduction provisions in the plastics treaty, top 30 oil and NGL producers, and top 15 plastic producers (sources: Adelphi and EJF analysis of country positions;[111] US Energy Information Administration;[112] Eunomia[113]).

Despite clear support for reducing plastic production from 145 countries, a handful of fossil fuel and petrochemical companies and oil producing countries are actively opposing production reduction targets and undermining negotiations for the plastics treaty.

While a handful of petrostates are obstructing negotiations, petrochemical companies are deploying an unprecedented lobbying offensive.[114] Analysis by the Center for International Environmental Law has revealed that at least 234 fossil fuel and chemical industry lobbyists attended the latest round of INC negotiations in Geneva, more than the combined diplomatic delegations of the EU and its 27 Member States.[115] Even more concerning, a number of lobbyists secured places in official state delegations including the delegations of Egypt, Kazakhstan, China and Iran.[116] Industry lobbyists and representatives have been deploying a range of tactics to influence and interfere in negotiations, such as manufacturing doubt by funding and promoting studies favourable to plastic products, sowing disinformation by promoting misleading claims, securing privileged access to policymakers, and pressuring government delegations.[117] The scale and intensity of lobbying efforts, with reported instances of harassment and intimidation of independent scientists by industry lobbyists,[118] as well as the extent of collusion between corporate and state interests, evidence the 'total infiltration' and 'corporate capture' of negotiations by the petrochemical bloc.[119]

Obstruction and lobbying by the petrochemical bloc have brought negotiations to a deadlock,[120] undermining multilateralism and the INC's mandate to end plastic pollution, and threatening our planet.

4.3 The way forward: robust, legally binding targets to reduce plastic production

Efforts by the petrochemical bloc should be seen for what they are: a last-ditch, desperate effort to stem the tide of change in the hope to shore up short-term profits. With the impacts of climate change growing more severe and widespread every day, and rising awareness of the precarity of humanity's future on Earth, the international community in its overwhelming majority supports action to reduce plastic production. Support comes from across the Global North and South, bringing together advanced and emerging economies, major plastic and oil and gas producers (**Figure 4**), civil society, companies from a wide range of industries,[121] and investors.[122]

The way forward is clear: the international community must not yield to bullies and give up on multilateralism; it must rally around high-ambition countries and deliver a robust treaty setting legally binding, measurable, and time-bound targets to reduce the production and consumption of primary plastics. If this cannot be achieved in the current negotiation framework for a universal instrument on plastic pollution, alternative avenues must be explored to secure the broadest possible support for a multilateral instrument.



Recommendations

To the governments and delegates of high-ambition countries involved in INC negotiations:


- Continue to work to secure in the near term an ambitious universal instrument on plastic pollution addressing the full life cycle of plastics, including provisions to reduce plastic production and consumption to sustainable levels, consistent with UNEP Resolution 5/14;
- If an agreement for a universal instrument cannot be reached, immediately continue to work with delegates of countries supporting production reduction towards the adoption of a multilateral treaty, building on existing convergence points to achieve the broadest possible participation in the treaty;
- Work with delegates to secure the inclusion in the treaty text of provisions establishing legally binding, measurable, and time-bound targets to reduce the production of primary plastics, consistent with the emissions reduction trajectory required to limit and reverse the overshoot of the Paris Agreement 1.5°C target (consider for example Rwanda's and Peru's proposal for a target to reduce plastic production by 40% by 2040);
- Work with delegates to secure the inclusion in the treaty text of provisions requiring the phasing out of harmful subsidies to the plastics industry;
- Work with delegates to secure the inclusion in the treaty preamble of a reference to the impacts of plastics on climate change and the urgency of reducing emissions in line with Paris Agreement targets;
- Call for the development of strong conflict-of-interest rules for participants in negotiations to prevent undue influence and interference by the petrochemical industry.

To the governments and delegates of plastic-producing states parties to the Paris Agreement:

- Include in their nationally determined contributions measurable and time-bound targets to reduce the production of primary plastics, consistent with the emissions reduction trajectory required to limit and reverse the overshoot of the 1.5°C target.

To the governments and delegates of all plastic-producing countries participating in climate negotiations at the 31st Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change:

- Commit to reduce the production of primary plastics based on measurable and time-bound targets, consistent with the emissions reduction trajectory required to limit and reverse the overshoot of the Paris Agreement 1.5°C target.



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