What are the challenges of community surveillance, and how can they be overcome?

Securing coastal state government buy-in

Some countries do not have rules and bodies for implementing and supervising community surveillance projects, which can potentially create barriers to rolling them out, and lead to friction between implementing non-governmental organisations and the relevant government authorities. It is also possible that certain coastal state governments may object to communities being involved in monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) programmes as such activities generally fall within the mandate of the national fisheries authority. This may be a particular challenge where the role of communities or third parties in gathering and submitting evidence is not yet recognised in relevant national legal or policy frameworks.

Furthermore, coastal state authorities may be reluctant to investigate information submitted via community surveillance for a number of reasons. These may include, among others, low levels of political will to take enforcement action with respect to IUU fishing, a lack of enforcement capacity, the involvement of powerful local or international actors within the fisheries sector, a mistrust of information submitted by third parties, and a lack of accountability or oversight of fisheries monitoring and enforcement.

Ensuring that community surveillance programmes are legal, transparent, and engage relevant authorities from an early stage are all means of addressing the above challenges, as well as ensuring participants understand the scope and jurisdiction of the project. This can be achieved through a range of approaches, including holding meetings and stakeholder events to showcase the programme to obtain and integrate feedback, and enabling access to the data retrieved through the app (while taking precautions to preserve the anonymity of those submitting evidence). Beyond this, local or national governments can participate in the capturing of evidence as well as, or alongside, fishers. In Senegal, for example, community surveillance is conducted via joint surveillance teams, which include members of the local artisanal fishing councils and staff of the coastal surveillance stations, who are local government officials.

Lack of community uptake

Finding motivated fishers to engage in community surveillance and ensuring that they continue to engage with projects is a challenging but pivotal component. In the case of community surveillance methods that require a smartphone app, fishers may be hesitant to take personal phones to sea in case of loss or damage.

In order to address this understandable concern, EJF has trialled a number of approaches with varying degrees of success. These options can be considered when deploying the DASE app, although the most appropriate or acceptable solution will likely depend on the local context and resources available:

  • Issue waterproof plastic phone holders to fishers participating in the community surveillance project to protect phones from water damage or loss at sea.

  • Provide fishers with smartphones with the DASE app already installed. This can be an expensive approach and there is a risk of phones being damaged, lost or stolen. EJF found this approach works best with trusted fishers with whom a strong relationship has already been built. However, fishers can still be reluctant to take phones to sea or may lend phones out for personal use by friends or family members rather than for surveillance activities.

  • Distribute geo-tagged digital cameras alongside the deployment of the mobile app. Geo-tagged cameras are often more robust than phones, simpler to operate, cheaper and less likely to be subject to theft. Distributing these cameras however comes with considerable cost and will likely require regular meetings with fishers in order to collect memory cards and upload the data – meaning they are best suited to be distributed in communities in proximity to the organisation deploying cameras.

Low literacy rates may present a barrier to the use of some technologies and needs to be considered in the design and rolling-out of community surveillance tools, ensuring they are intuitive to use and thorough training is conducted. If possible, ensure that tools can be adapted to local dialects or can use symbols.

Fishers may also become demotivated over time if competent authorities fail to take enforcement action in response to evidence submitted on illegal activities, if they have technical issues or if they do not feel supported by the organisation that has recruited them for community surveillance. With this in mind, ongoing engagement with communities beyond the initial deployment phase is vital. This support is not only essential for those collecting evidence at sea, but can also help the implementing organisation to better understand the behavioural and technological factors that determine uptake and continued engagement.

Safety risks to fishers

IUU fishing is increasingly recognised as a transnational criminal issue, closely aligned in some instances with corruption, labour abuses and human trafficking and linked to global criminal networks. As such, there are risks associated with documenting IUU fishing at sea, including hostility from crew members of suspected illegal fishing vessels, that must be acknowledged and mitigated. In Senegal, small-scale fishers have reported being sprayed with boiling water when trying to confront industrial vessels over the destruction of their fishing gear.

Safety training is therefore vitally important (a range of resources are available online on safety at sea, e.g. ‘Safety at sea for small-scale fishers’ produced by the FAO). Fishers should be advised to avoid confrontation at all costs and to maintain a safe distance from vessels when engaging in surveillance. They should also be trained on how to spot and react to aggression to ensure their safety. It is also important that community surveillance projects do not financially incentivise risk behaviours – for example by offering money for images of vessels, or money for evidence of IUU fishing more broadly.

EN Fundedbythe EU RGB POS